• Publications

    Peer-Reviewed and Edited Volumes

    Signaling in Foreign Policy” (with Erik Gartzke, Shannon Carcelli, and Jack Zhang) for The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Cameron Thies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)  

    Book Reviews

    Review of A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia, by Thomas A. Drohan. 2016 Parameters. 46(4)

    Working Projects

    I Saw the Sign: Explaining Military Signals

    Abstract

    Signaling one's resolve and capabilities should help countries avoid war by communicating the conditions for a negotiated bargain that can serve the same ends as war. However, the spiral model of conflict holds that communicating resolve and capability could cause your opponent to feel threatened and respond in kind, thus escalating tensions. How can preparation for conflict be a deterrent, yet also be a precursor to conflict? This disagreement begs the question of why countries sometimes signal prior to conflict but in other instances they do not. To fully understand a country's decision to signal or not signal prior to a conflict we must therefore understand the relationship between signaling and what a country hopes to 'win' in a dispute. This paper suggests that countries hoping to achieve a negotiated settlement will militarily mobilize in an informational manner designed to signal while those that hope to fight a conflict will militarily mobilize in a tactical manner designed to win. Analyzing signaling through military mobilization in 470 crises over the past century reveals variation in the military tools used, their role in signaling, and the consequent effect on what crises escalate to conflict.


    Poster at the Peace Science Society (International) Conference (November 2017)


    Presentation at the UC San Diego International Relations Retreat (June 2017)

    An Empirical Approach to Defining Military Domains

    Abstract

    Military capacity is considered central to national power, yet its measures remain aggregated and generalized. This paper aims to produce a better understanding of military capacity through a nuanced analysis of military technologies. The acumen of these technological bundles determine the military systems available to a given country and thus define military strategy, structure, and success. This research paper introduces the DoD's Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) to shed light on the composition of technological bundles as well as empirically identifying military domains based on their technological portfolios. This new way of thinking about military technology through empirical validation will shed light on nations' system integration skills, the complementarity and substitutability of military technologies, and the role that alliances, trade ties, and domestic factor endowments play in shaping a military's technological portfolio.


    Poster at the 10th Annual Political Networks Conference (June 2017)

    • Awarded Honorable Mention

    After Deterrence: Explaining Conflict Short of War

    Abstract

    Policymakers are increasingly concerned about conflict ``in the gray zone"--- the region between peace and war where, it is feared, challengers are able to alter the status quo without fear of triggering a larger military confrontation.  Paradigmatic examples include the Russian annexation of Crimea and incursion into Eastern Ukraine and China's island building campaign in the South China Sea. Here, we define gray zone conflict in a manner that emphasizes theoretical consistency and highlights novel features and implications of its causes. While gray zone conflicts are often perceived as deterrence failures, they are better understood as responses to deterrence success. A key puzzle involves understanding why capable countries choose to fight in a limited fashion. To the degree that gray zone conflict results from prior deterrence successes, raising the cost of limited war could yield peace. Alternatively, the decision to fight in the gray zone could reflect an optimal low-cost war fighting strategy, in which case doubling down on deterrence risks escalation and broader war.


    Poster at the 10th Annual Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Conference (April 2017)


    Presentation at the 2017 Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence Retreat (August 2017)

    Cruisin’ for a Bruisin’: The Effects of US Cruise Missile Strikes Since the Gulf War

    Abstract

    Un-piloted weapons have become an increasingly common tool in US military strategy, yet most relevant scholarship has focused on drones. This paper complements that research by providing the first comprehensive dataset of the entire universe of  US cruise missile strikes from 1991-2017. This fine grained data allows scholars to examine the important of the various platforms used to launch cruise missiles, the geographic location and type of specific targets, and when cruise missiles are utilized during military operations. This article introduces the dataset of all US cruise missile incidents from 1991-2017, describes the variables of interest, and suggests important political questions that can be analyzed through the use of this data.


    Poster at the International Studies Association (ISA) Conference (April 2018)

    One, if by land, and two, if by sea: Introducing a Dataset on the Domains of Crisis Behavior

    Abstract

    The military capabilities a nation employs during a crisis - known as domains - is

    widely believed to be important in the study of international relations, yet scholarly research on this topic remains limited. This paper introduces a new dataset on the military domains and units employed by state actors during 455 international crises from 1918 to 2007. It discusses the coding procedures, describes global trends, and provides one empirical application of the dataset to show how the study of the means used during international crises contributes to our understanding of international relations. We provide preliminary evidence that crisis outcomes are more likely to favor actors that deploy naval units.


    Presentation at the International Studies Association (ISA) Conference (April 2018)

    Coordination in Conflict Theaters: Explaining Ally Contributions to Military Conflicts

    • co-authored with Daniel Kent

    Abstract

    Theories of international alliances are often concerned with how the structure and nature of . security relationships impact cooperative efforts. Yet, the existing literature lacks an understanding of the process by which countries determine military contributions to a specific conflict theater. To fully understand the reliability of security communities when tested, we propose a novel theory and empirical investigation of the aspects of security cooperation that influence allied contributions to warfighting in conflict theaters. We construct a new data set of country-level force structures and each country’s specific force commitments to the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. We then apply techniques for statistical inference in social networks to produce insights into the strategic considerations that influence decisions to provide various military capabilities to a conflict theater. This paper suggests that a country’s propensity to actively burden-share, providing a substantial portion of its available military resources, rather than engage in free-riding, depends upon two variables: the availability of critical resources in a country’s military portfolio and a state’s position within that alliance network.  We hypothesize that when the relative costs of committing needed resources are low and/or the benefits of a strong reputation in the security community are high, states will tend to burden-share rather than free-ride. The implications of this argument bear widely on concerns over the strength of modern alliances in a changing international system